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Abstract
The effect of inequality on savings has remained an open empirical issue de-
spite of several decades of research. Results obtained in this study indicate that
inequality and private consumption are both I(1) nonstationary variables that are
cointegrated with each other. This implies that previous empirical research may
have produced spurious results on effect of inequality on savings or consumption
by assuming that inequality would be a stationary variable. According to estima-
tion results, income inequality has had a negative effect on private consumption
in Central-European and Nordic countries. Results for Anglo-Saxon countries are
inconclusive.
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1 Introduction
The effect of savings on capital accumulation and growth has been one of the fun-
damental research topics in economics starting from the very beginning of economic
sciences. According to Smith (1776), an increased division of labor raises produc-
tivity, but savings govern capital accumulation, which enables production growth. In
the 18th century, only rich people saved. Therefore, economic growth was possible
only when there were enough rich people in society. However, according to Keynes
(1964), inequality of income would slow down economic growth. Keynes argued that
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marginal consumption decreases as income of individual increases, and thus, aggre-
gate consumption depends on changes in aggregate income. Because demand is the
basis of investments, and because inequality lowers aggregate consumption, inequality
of income would diminish economic growth. In neo-classical growth models, income
distribution determines the level savings and thus the level of capital accumulation
(Solow 1956; Kaldor 1957).
In addition to the approach of classical economics, there exists several theories
describing the effect of income inequality on savings or consumption. These include
the permanent income hypothesis by Friedman (1957), life-cycle hypothesis by Ando
and Modigliani (1963), which was further developed to include intergenerational trans-
fers by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), savings under liquidity constraints by Deaton
(1991), and political-economy models (e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1994)).
Although theoretical research spans through several decades, the effect of income
inequality on savings remains an open empirical question. This is because empirical
studies have produced controversial results on the effect of income inequality on sav-
ings. In one of the most recent panel econometric studies, Leigh and Posso (2009)
estimate the effect of the income shares of the top 1% on the percent share of gross
savings on GDP and find no statistically significant effect on inequality to national
savings. Similarly, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000) find no statistically significant
effect on inequality on percent share of savings on GDP using several different mea-
sures of income inequality. However, Smith (2001) finds that inequality, measured with
Deininger and Squire’s (1996) Gini index, has a statistically robust positive effect on
the percent share of savings on GDP. Cook (1995) finds the same effect at work in less
developed economies. Li and Zou (2004) find that the relation between inequality and
savings might vary across different countries, using Deininger and Squire’s (1996) Gini
index and ratio of savings to GDP.
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All the empirical studies summarized above have assumed that income inequal-
ity, measured either by Gini index or by share of income earned by different income
classes, is a stationary variable. However, Malinen (2011) has recently obtained results
according to which the data generating process of income distribution might be driven
by a stochastic trend. That is, income inequality could be a I(1) nonstationary variable.
If this result would hold in general, it would offer an explanation for the controversy in
previous empirical studies. This is because regressing a stationary variable against an
I(1) variable(s) can lead to spurious regressions (Stewart 2010). In empirical studies,
savings is usually measured as a percent of GDP. If both savings and GDP are I(1)
variables and cointegrated of order 1, dividing them with each other will result to a
stationary variable, namely savings as a percent of GDP or savings as a ratio of GDP.
Thus, if inequality would be I(1) variable and savings as a ratio of GDP a stationary
I(0) variable, regressing savings against inequality could give spurious results. Even if
both variables would be I(1) and cointegrated, many regressors are biased, like OLS,
or inconsistent, like conventional GMM, when applied to panel cointegrated data (Kao
and Chiang 2000). Thus, it is possible that previous aggregate studies assessing the
effect on inequality to savings may have produced biased results.
This study accounts for these sources of bias with panel cointegration methods and
data on the income shares of the top 1%, which is used to proxy the distribution of
income. This measure is found to follow broader measure of income inequality, like
the Gini index, very well (Leigh 2007). Changes in national and private savings are
measured with the gross national savings and total expenditure of private consumption.
According to panel unit root tests, the income share of the top 1% and gross national
savings and private consumption are found to be I(1) variables. Income share of the top
1% is also found to be cointegrated with private consumption using panel cointegration
testing methods. Results of panel cointegration tests are inconclusive for possible coin-
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tegration between gross savings and top 1% income share. The real GDP per capita and
aggregate savings like the real GDP per capita and private consumption are also found
to be cointegrated. This implies that ratio of savings and private consumption to GDP
would be a stationary variable and that previous research has been likely to produce
spurious results on the effect of inequality on savings.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the theoretical and em-
pirical background for the study. Section 3 describes the data and presents the results
of unit root tests. Section 4 reports the results of cointegration tests and section 5 gives
the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical and empirical considerations
2.1 Baseline theories on the effect of income inequality on savings
In classical economic theory, the form of the individual saving function determines
the effect of income inequality on savings. When the saving function is linear or con-
cave, distribution of income and wealth converge toward equality (Stiglitz 1969). If the
saving function is convex, the marginal propensity to save increases with income.
According to permanent income hypothesis, individuals with low-income have
higher propensity to consume and that small changes in income, or its distribution,
do not affect on consumption decisions of households (Friedman 1957). Life-cycle
hypothesis argues that, if bequests are luxury, saving rates should be higher among
wealthier individuals (Kotlikoff and Summers 1981). According to models with liquid-
ity constraints, if borrowing constraints affect mostly poorer households, redistribution
from wealthy to poor households makes borrowing constraints less likely to bind, thus
lowering aggregate saving (Deaton 1991). In political-economy models, more unequal
income distribution may create demand for more redistribution through taxation and
redistribution, and if the saving function of individuals in the economy is convex, i.e.
the rich save more, this will diminish aggregate savings through diminished incomes
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of the rich (Alesina and Perotti 1994).
Theories on saving behavior have usually assumed that neither the production nor
the consumption processes would include stochastic parts. However, this may not have
been a realistic assumption as many economic variables tend to have some stochas-
tic process affecting them. In a pioneering work, Hall (1978) formulated a model of
consumption where the behavior of households were determined by a stochastic trend.
Hall argued that the conditional expectation of future marginal utility is only a func-
tion of today’s level of consumption, which means that marginal utility would be a
random walk. If marginal utility would be a linear function of consumption, then,
naturally, consumption would also be driven by a stochastic trend. According to to
Hall, ct = λct−1 + t would be a good enough approximation of stochastic behavior of
consumption under the life cycle and permanent income hypotheses. Here t would
summarize the impact of all new information coming available to the consumer at pe-
riod t.
The formulation of Hall (1978) implied that assuming a nonstationary consump-
tion does not alter the implications of the life cycle - permanent income hypothesis
for income inequality, i.e., that earners of high income have higher propensity to save.
However, it is also realistic to assume that income itself is driven by a stochastic pro-
cess, and that income might have a linear relation with consumption. This would lead
to nonstationary consumption and asset processes.
2.2 Stochastic growth, savings and liquidity constraints
Stochastic growth models assume that some part of the aggregate production is driven
by a stochastic trend. General approach in the literature has been to assume uncertainty
that enters the aggregate production function in some form. In the first systematic
analysis of stochastic growth, Brock and Mirman (1973) studied uncertainty in neo-
classical framework. In discrete time, their aggregate production function was given
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by
Y(t) = F(K(t),L(t),z(t)), (1)
where z(t) is the stochastic productivity term that dtermines how productive a given
combination of capital and labor is in producing the unique final good of the economy
and it is usually assumed to follow a Markow chain process with values in the set
Z ≡ {z1, ..., .zN}. To generalize, the production function function can be written as yt ≡
f (k(t),z(t)), where k(t) ≡ K(t)/L(t). Consumption and savings decisions of households
are made after observing the realization of the stochastic shock for time t, z(t), which
means that saving behavior is affected by stochastic components.
Deaton (1991) has examined how liquidity constraints affect national savings, when
incomes are driven by random walk with drift.1 He finds that, when income is a ran-
dom walk and borrowing constraints are binding, it is undesirable for households to
undertake any smoothing of consumption implying that consumption equals income.
However, Deaton (1991) assumes that the interest rate is higher than the consumers
discount rate. If the interest rate equals the consumers discount rate, stochastic in-
come process and borrowing constraints lead to a result where propensity to consume
is lower in higher income levels (Seater 1997; Travaglini 2008).
2.3 Empirical findings
In the pioneering work by Hall (1978), consumption was assumed to be stochastic, but
not affected by income. Nonetheless, his US data gave some evidence that recent levels
of income have an effect on aggregate consumption. Campbell and Deaton (1989)
found that consumption and lagged income are positively correlated implying that if
income is stochastic, so is consumption.
1Assuming a drift in income relation is intuitive and necessary, because income tends to grow over time.
Thus, just variations around that trend are assumed to be stochastic.
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King et al. (1991) tested the hypothesis of balanced growth under uncertainty, i.e.,
that consumption, investments, and output are cointegrated I(1) nonstationary vari-
ables. Their data on post-war US supported the hypothesis. Sarantis and Stewart
(1999) found that income-consumption ratios are nonstationary in OECD countries
using so called traditional panel unit root tests. Their result implies that income and
consumption are not cointegrated. This result was supported by Cook (2005) using a
panel LM unit root test allowing for structural breaks. However, neither of these panel
unit root testing procedures allowed for cross-sectional dependence. Romero-Ávila
(2009) showed that when cross-sectional dependency is taken into account, OECD
consumption-income ratios are stationary.
There is a lot of research on the relation between aggregate consumption and in-
come, but studies on the relationship between income inequality and aggregate con-
sumption have been rare or non-existent. This obviously relates to the assumption that
income inequality would be a stationary variable, which would make such statistical
comparisons meaningless (see introduction). But, if income inequality is found to be
driven by a stochastic process, then aggregate comparisons would the only consistent
way to assess the relationship between inequality and consumption or savings. Thus,
we turn on testing the time series properties of the included variables.
3 Data and tests of time series properties
3.1 Data
In this study we use the the top 1% income share of population to proxy the income
distribution in different countries. In recent years there has been a growing interest to-
wards building a long time series on the evolution of top income shares of population.
Beginning from the work of Piketty (2003), top income series have been developed for
several developed countries. This measuring technique makes it possible to construct
substantially longer time series from the evolution of the distribution of income than
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what would be possible using the Gini index or similar aggregate measures. Leigh
(2007) has also demonstrated that the top 1% income share series have a high correla-
tion with other measures of income inequality, like the Gini index. The dataset on top
1% income shares gathered by Leigh is a primary source of data in this study.
However, after Leigh (2007) published his dataset there have been additions to the
pool countries from which a historical dataset of the evolution of top incomes is avail-
able. Roine and Waldenström (2010) have used a data collected from several different
sources in their analysis of common trends and shocks in top income series. Their
dataset on top incomes is extensive, but it has one caveat. They do not have contin-
uous observations from all countries, and so they are forced to extrapolate over some
observations. This is problematic, because it is likely that extrapolation of over just
one observation will alter the time series properties of the observed variable. Because
Roine and Waldenström do not explicitly describe the observation over which they are
extrapolating, one has to look for the individual sources from where the time series is
obtained to know where the missing observations lie. After observing the individuals
sources of data, we include two countries from the dataset by Roine and Waldenström,
which are Norway and Finland.2
The dataset of this study consists of observations on 13 countries, which are: Aus-
tralia, Canada, Finland, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. Nine of these countries form the
baseline data on which we have observations from all included variables. These coun-
tries are: Canada, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom and United States.
The endogenous variables used in this study are gross savings and private con-
2For these two countries, the data on top 1% income share comes from the dataset by Roine and Walden-
ström (2010). For Norway, we can check the continuity of the time series data from the original source. In
Finland’s case the original data, allegedly spanning from 1920 to 2005, could not be checked, but we could
check that the data is continuous at least from 1966 onwards. Panel unit root tests are done also without
Nordic countries, and because extrapolation would have the biggest impact on those tests, the bias created
by possible extrapolation over some values of top 1% series in Finland is diminished.
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sumption. The data on these is obtained from AMECO database held by the European
Comission. AMECO is used, because it has more extensive time series coverage on the
variables in question than, for example, the dataset of World Bank. AMECO does not
include data on private savings, but because private consumption is the mirror image
of private savings, it should not make any difference which of these variables is used.
Both variables are measured in aggregate terms to minimize the effects that some third
variable might have on the relation between inequality and savings. Changes, for ex-
ample, in fertility may have an effect on variables that are measured in per capita terms
without affecting the income share of the top 1%. Thus, expressing gross savings and
private consumption in per capita terms could add stochastic elements to the time series
of those variables that are unrelated to the relation that those variables may have with
income inequality.
The control variables included in the estimation are the real gross domestic product
per capita, the dependency rate, and the interest rate, which are likely to be the most
common control variables used in the literature. The real GDP per capita is historically
thought to proxy the expected lifetime wealth of residents in a country (Cook 1995).
Level of income may also have an direct effect on savings. The dependency rate is used
to control for possible changes in the saving patterns across the life-cycle of individuals,
and it measures the ratio of population of under 15 and over 64 years of age. Interest
rates may affect individuals propensity to save by making saving more profitable or
vice versa. 1960 is the first year included in the dataset and the last year included in the
dataset varies with different groups of countries. The data on dependency is obtained
from World Banks World Development Indicators and the data on interest rate is from
the database of the International Monetary Fund.
The data on interest rates varies across countries in the dataset. Baseline rate is the
discount or the bank rate, i.e., the rate at which central banks lend to deposit money
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banks. However, for some countries observations for this variable are not available for
the whole time period. That is why there are some differences in the indicators of inter-
est rates between groups of countries. In Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland,
the central bank rate is used. In Canada, United Kingdom, and USA, the treasury bill
rate is used, which gives the rate at which short-term securities are issued or traded in
the market. In France and Netherlands, the money market rate is used, which gives
the rate on short term lending between financial institutions. Although using different
indicators of interest rates is not optimal, all these indicators should reflect changes in
the interest rate at which consumers loan from and deposit money to banks.
3.2 Unit root testing
To test for possible unit roots, four different panel unit root tests are used. The first two
are the so called traditional and the last two the so called second generation panel unit
root tests. The traditional panel unit root tests, by Im et al. (2003) and the panel version
of the ADF test by Maddala and Wu (1999), are based on the following regression:
4yit = ρiyi,t−1 +δi +ηit+ θt + it, (2)
where δi are individual constants, ηit are individual time trends, and θt are the com-
mon time effects. The tests rely on the assumption that E[it js] = 0 ∀ t, s and i , j,
which is required for calculating common time effects. Thus, if the different series are
correlated, the last assumption is violated.
The second generation tests by Pesaran (2007) and Phillips and Sul (2003) are
based on the regression
4yit = ρyi,t−1 +ηit+αi +δiθt + it, (3)
where αis are the individual constants, ηit are the individual time trends, and θt is the
common time effect, whose coefficients, δi, are assumed to be non-stochastic, measure
the impact of the common time effects of series i, and it is assumed to be normally
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distributed with mean zero and covariance of σ2 over t. Cross-sectional dependence is
allowed through the common time effects and it is assumed to be independent of  js
and θs for all i , j and s, t. The null hypothesis in all tests is that ρi = 0 ∀ i and the
alternative hypothesis is that the majority of the series are stationary.
Table 1 presents the results of the four panel unit root tests for top 1% income
share. Tests have been applied to three different datasets. The first includes the data on
three countries with the longest continuous time series in the dataset by Leigh (2007).
The second dataset includes the nine countries on who we have data for all the in-
cluded variables. The third dataset includes observations from seven countries ex-
cluding Nordic countries from 1983-2002.3 This is because, according to Roine and
Waldenström (2010), there is a trend break in the series of the top 1% income share in
1991 in Nordic countries. There is a trend break in the top 1% income share series in
Anglo-Saxon countries, including Australia, Canada, UK and USA, in 1982, in Central
European countries, including France, Switzerland, and Netherlands, in 1976, and in
Asian countries, including Japan, in 1983. So, to make sure that the results of unit root
tests are not driven by structural breaks, tests are run using only those countries that
should not have breaks in their top 1% income share series in the tested period.
Table 1: Panel unit root tests for the series of top 1% income share
variable IPS ADF Pesaran PS
top 1%, 1925-1998 3.689 6.489 0.403 15.743
(0.999) (0.953) (0.657) (0.203)
top 1%, 1960-1996 4.831 3.148 0.235 2.812
(0.999) (0.998) (0.593) (0.999)
top 1%, 1983-2002 -0.302 16.670 -0.281 17.636
(0.381) (0.273) (0.389) (0.127)
The tested equation is: 4yit = ρiyi,t−1 +δi +ηit+θt +it . All variables are tested in logarithms. Probabilities of
the test statistics appear in parentheses. In all other tests, except in the PS test, lag lengths were determined
using Schwarts information criterion (SIC). Dataset of 1925-1998 includes 7 countries and 518 observations,
the dataset of 1960-1996 includes 9 countries and 333 observations, and the dataset of 1983-2002 includes 7
countries and 140 observations.
3Countries included in the test are: Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, United King-
dom, and USA.
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According to all tests in all datasets, the logarithmic top 1% income share would be
a I(1) nonstationary process, even when possible structural breaks are accounted for.
Table 2 presents the results of panel unit root tests for other variables. Because gross
savings is expressed in constant Euros and private consumption in purchasing power
parities, two series of real GDP per capita series are included in the dataset.
Table 2: Panel unit root tests for other included variables, 1960-1996
variable IPS ADF Pesaran PS
gross savings 2.207 2.144 -0.186 4.79
(0.986) (0.999) (0.426) (1.000)
consumption 12.532 0.0645 0.221 7.53
(1.000) (1.000) (0.587) (0.960)
GDP, ppp 11.006 14.039 0.347 5.331
(1.000) (1.000) (0.636) (0.994)
GDP, eur 3.912 19.453 2.420 11.210
(1.000) (0.364) (0.992) (0.796)
dependency -5.077 82.382 1.005 50.92
(<.001) (<.001) (0.843) (<.001)
interest rate 0.717 13.937 -1.144 19.97
(0.764) (0.731) (0.126) (0.220)
The tested equation is: 4yit = ρiyi,t−1 +δi +ηit+θt +it . All variables are tested in logarithms. Probabilities of
the test statistics appear in parentheses. In all other tests, except in the PS test, lag lengths were determined
using Schwarts information criterion (SIC). Testing includes 9 countries and 333 observations.
According to all tests, series of gross savings, private consumption, interest rates,
and both versions of real GDP per capita would be I(1) processes. 3 out of 4 tests
reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity of the dependency rate, which implies that
it would be a trend-stationary variable.
4 Cointegration tests
4.1 Testing with the whole data
The methods for testing for cointegration in panel data have developed very rapidly
during the first decade of the 21st century. One of the most commonly used cointegra-
tion testing method has been the residual based panel cointegration test by Pedroni
(2004). The limitation of Pedroni’s test is that it assumes independence of cross-
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sections, an assumption, which is likely to be violated in econometric cross-country
studies.4 Cross-sectional correlation, if not accounted for, may bias the results towards
rejecting the null of no cointegration, whereas structural breaks can bias the results
towards acceptance of the null. To account for both of these biases, a panel cointegra-
tion test developed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) is used. It controls for
cross-sectional dependency by common factors, and for breaks by allowing for shifts
in the level, slope, trend, and cointegration vector. Possible endogeneity of regressors
is controlled for in the same way as in panel DSUR, i.e., by including leads and lags of
differenced explanatory variables in estimation (see the appendix). A more thorough
explanation of the test by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) is presented in the
appendix.
Table 3 presents the results of the panel cointegration test by Banerjee and Carrion-
i-Silvestre (2006) between the top 1% income share and gross savings, and the top
1% income share and private consumption. The test allows for level and cointegration
vector shifs.5
According to the results of the ZtˆNT (λˆ) test presented in table 3, gross savings and
the income share of top 1% as well as private consumption and top 1% income share
would be cointegrated at the 5% level, even when possible structural breaks are taken
into account. According to the ZρˆNT (λˆ) test, only gross savings and the top 1% income
share would be cointegrated. However, Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) note
that the ZtˆNT (λˆ) statistic should be preferred over the ZρˆNT (λˆ) statistic, because the
former has considerably better size and power properties especially in small samples.
Thus, we rely more on the results of the ZtˆNT (λˆ), and conclude that both gross savings
and private consumption seem to be cointegrated with the top 1% income share.
Table 4 presents the results of the panel cointegration test by Banerjee and Carrion-
4There are, for example, only few countries that avoided the downturn of 2008 that started from the U.S.
5Estimation done with Gauss. We are grateful to Carrion-i-Silvestre for providing the program code.
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Table 3: Banerjee & Carrion-i-Silvestre’s cointegration test for gross savings, final
consumption and the income share of top 1%
gross savings private consumption
Pedroni model with a trend
ZtˆNT (λˆ) -3.952 -2.255
(<.0001) (0.0121)
ZρˆNT (λˆ) -3.084 -0.548
(0.0010) (0.292)
Level and slope trend shifts
ZtˆNT (λˆ) -5.849 -1.860
(<.0001) (0.0314)
ZρˆNT (λˆ) 0.403 2.564
(0.6565) (0.9948)
Trend and cointegrating vector shifts
ZtˆNT (λˆ) -5.706 -1.678
(<.0001) (0.047)
ZρˆNT (λˆ) 1.527 3.917
(0.937) (0.999)
countries 9 9
years 1960-1996 1960-1996
observations 333 333
Model with level shift includes time trend and a level and slope trend shift. Model with a cointegrating vector
shift includes time trend and cointegration vector shifts.
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Table 4: Banerjee & Carrion-i-Silvestre’s cointegration test for gross savings, final
consumption and GDP per capita
gross savings private consumption
Pedroni model with a trend
ZtˆNT (λˆ) -5.683 -5.494
(<.0001) (<.0001)
ZρˆNT (λˆ) -3.090 -6.399
(0.0010) (<.0001)
Level and slope trend shifts
ZtˆNT (λˆ) -5.736 -4.042
(<.0001) (<.0001)
ZρˆNT (λˆ) -0.244 0.8242
(0.4038) (0.7951)
Trend and cointegrating vector shifts
ZtˆNT (λˆ) -5.125 -4.898
(<.0001) (<.0001)
ZρˆNT (λˆ) -0.0155 -0.3939
(0.4945) (0.3469)
countries 9 9
years 1960-1996 1960-1996
observations 333 333
Explanatory variable in both tests is GDP per capita. Model with level shift includes time trend and a level
and slope trend shift. Model with a cointegrating vector shift includes time trend and cointegration vector
shifts.
i-Silvestre (2006) between the real GDP per capita and gross savings, and between the
real GDP per capita and private consumption.6 The test allows for level and cointegra-
tion vector shifs.7
According to the results of table 4, the GDP per capita and gross savings would be
cointegrated of order 1. Results also imply cointegration of the GDP per capita and
private consumption.
6GDP per capita in Euros is used in the for gross savings as the gross savings series is also presented in
Euros. GDP per capita in ppp is used in the test for private savings for the same reason.
7Estimation done with Gauss. We are grateful to Carrion-i-Silvestre for providing the program code.
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4.2 Testing for the cointegration rank
As presented in section 3.1, it is likely that several variables have an effect on the rela-
tionship between inequality and savings and/or consumption. One of the obvious draw-
backs of the residual tests, like the one presented above, is that they cannot identify the
number of cointegrating vectors between the variables. If we have just two variables,
this is not a problem, because, then there can be only 1 cointegrating vector. With three
variables, there can be two cointegrating vectors, with four variables three cointegrat-
ing vectors, etc. The rank of cointegration affects estimators, because some estimators,
like panel DSUR, are based on the single equation approach meaning a single coin-
tegration relationship is assumed. If there are two or more cointegration relationships
between the variables, the asymptotic properties of the estimators derived under the
assumption of one cointegration relation are no longer valid. In addition, estimators
allowing for multiple cointegrating vectors usually assume that the cointegration rank
is homogenous across the countries included in the panel, like the estimator of Breitung
(2005) used in this study.
For these reasons we use the panel trace cointegration test developed by Larsson
and Lyhagen (2007) to test for the cointegration rank of models involving several ex-
planatory variables. Their test is based on the likelihood ratio test developed by Jo-
hansen (1995). The general model on which Larsson ja Lyhagen’s test is based can be
written as
4Yit = µi +ΠYi,t−1 +Σm−1k=1 ∆Yi,t−k + it, (4)
where Π = αikβk j, Π and Γk are of order Np×Np and µi and it are of order Np×1, and
t = (′1t, 
′
2t, ..., 
′
nt) is assumed to be multivariate normally distributed with mean zero
and covariance matrix Ω.
It is assumed that matrix Π has a reduced rank of Nr, 0 ≤ r ≤ p, and can be decom-
posed as Π = αikβ′k j (Larsson and Lyhagen 2007). αik is assumed to be unrestricted, but
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βk j = 0 ∀i , j. The unrestricted α means that different panel units can be dependent,
but because of the restriction on β, these dependency relations can only appear in the
short run. In other words, cointegrating relations are only allowed within the units of
the panel. The cointegration rank is estimated by sequentially testing
H(r) : rank(Π) ≤ Nr (5)
against the alternative
H(p) : rank(Π) ≤ Np (6)
as in Johansen (1995). A more detailed explanation of the test is provided in the ap-
pendix.
A limitation in the panel cointegration test by Larsson and Lyhagen (2007) is that
the number of estimated parameters increases rapidly with the number of cross sec-
tions. This means that there needs to be enough time series observations compared
to cross-sectional units, or the parameters of the model cannot be estimated. In our
baseline dataset, there are nine countries and 37 time series observations per country, a
relation which is far too small for the test. For this reason, the nine countries are divided
in to three groups of countries according to their economic models. The groups are:
Nordic, Central-European, and Anglo-Saxon countries.8 Because countries in these
groups tend to have similar economic and social structures, it is more likely that they
also have homogenous cointegration relations.
Table 5 presents the results of the test for cointegration rank by Larsson and Ly-
hagen (2007) for the three groups of countries for gross savings and private consump-
tion.9 All variables are detrended and demeaned before testing. VAR lag lengths were
determined using the Schwartz information criterion (SIC).
8Canada, United Kingdom and Unites States are included in the Anglo-Saxon group. France, Nether-
lands, and Switzerland are included in the Central-European group, and Finland, Norway, and Finland are
included in the group of Nordic countries.
9All testing is done by Gauss. We are grateful to Johan Lyhagen for providing the Gauss code on his
homepage.
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Table 5: Panel trace cointegration test for savings, consumption and the top 1% income
share for the 3 country groups
Nordics Central-Europe* Anglo-Saxon**
depend. var.: gross savings
top 1%, GDP & interest
r=0 469.50 226.03 410.50
(381.22) (214.15) (390.57)
r≤1 301.53 126.08 247.69
(283.40) (141.31) (291.88)
r≤2 186.47 - -
(175.66)
r≤3 113.70 - -
(83.32)
depend. var.: private consumption
top 1%, GDP & interest
r=0 410.85 516.43 1137.26
(381.27) (470.88) (992.44)
r≤1 281.61 194.42 586.90
(267.77) (214.56) (523.78)
r≤2 172.84 - 300.25
(166.60) (336.24)
r≤3 58.99 - -
(89.81)
countries 3 3 3
years 1960-03 1960-96 1960-00
observations 132 111 123
All series are detrended and demeaned before testing. * In the group of Central European countries, only
GDP per capita and top 1% income share were included in the test, because there were too few time series
observations per country to include a 4 variable. ** for Anglo-Saxon countries, GDP per capita in constant
Euros was used instead of GDP per capita in purchasing power parities in the test with private consumption.
All variables are tested in logarithms. Bartlett corrected critical values are presented in parentheses. Lag
lengths were selected using Schwarz information criterion.
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According to the results presented in the upper panel of table 5, there is one cointe-
gration vector between gross savings, the GDP, the top 1% income share and the inter-
est rate in Anglo-Saxon countries. In Central European countries, only gross savings,
the top 1% income share, and the GDP per capita were included in the test, because
there were not enough time series observations for including four variables. Accord-
ing to the results, the cointegration rank among these variables in Central-European
countries is one.
According to the results of the Nordic countries presented in the upper panel of
table 5, there are (at least) four stationary linear combinations with four explanatory
variables. In the time series case this would imply that all variables are I(0) trend-
stationary. In panels, implications are not so straightforward. In the model (5), the
block matrix elements of Π are given by Πi j = ΣNk=1αikβ
′
jk, which equal αi jβ
′
j when
βi j = 0 for all i , j. However, if βi j , 0 for i , j, then the block matrix elements of Π
are given αi jβ′jk and the rank of Π can be larger than the number of variables. That is,
because the dimension of Π is Np×Np, the number of cross-sectional cointegration
relations may increase the rank of the matrix. If only gross savings, the interest rate
and the top 1% are included in the test, two stationary linear combinations are found,
i.e., a rank of two. If only gross savings and the GDP per capita are included, the test
finds a rank of, at least, two. This implies that the GDP per capita series may be, in
part at least, driven by a stationary linear combination of I(1) non-stationary common
factor(s). As Nordic countries have very similar social structures, and because they
are small countries within close proximity to each other, it would be quite natural if a
common stochastic trend would affect their GDP series. Thus, it seems that GDP per
capita series in constant Euros are likely to be cross-sectionally cointegrated in Nordic
countries.10
10Possible cross-unit cointegration may have affected panel unit root tests, but because cross-unit cointe-
gration increases the likelihood of type I error, i.e., that null hypothesis of unit root is rejected wrongfully,
cross-sectional cointegration has not biased the inference made from panel unit root tests (Banerjee et al.
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According to the results presented in the lower panel of table 5, private consump-
tion, the GDP per capita, the top 1% income share, and the interest rate would have
a cointegration rank of two in the Anglo-Saxon countries and or cointegration rank of
three in the Nordic countries. In Central European countries only private consumption,
the top 1% income share and the GDP per capita were included in the testing, because
there were not enough time series observations for including four variables. In Central-
European countries the cointegration rank among these three variables is found to be
one.
The results of Nordic countries implying the presence of a common stochastic trend
driving the real GDP processes, unfortunately, raises an another dilemma. If income
is affected by a common stochastic trend, it is likely to affect consumption as well,
especially if the two variables are cointegrated (see previous section). To test this as-
sumption, in table 6 we present the results of Larsson and Lyhagen (2007) panel coin-
tegration test using just two variables, the income share of top 1%, and gross savings
and private consumption each in turn.
According to the results presented in table 6, there are, at least, two stationary coin-
tegration relations in the group of Nordic countries in both tests. As explained above,
this is likely to indicate that gross savings and private consumption levels are cross-
sectionally cointegrated across the Nordic countries.11 In addition, the results also
imply that the top 1% income share and gross savings would be difference stationary
variables in the Central European and Anglo-Saxon countries. That is, both would be
I(1) variables that are not cointegrated with each other. Private consumption and the
top 1% income share, on the other hand, are found to be cointegrated of order one in
the Central European and Anglo-Saxon countries.
(2005)).
11In principle, top 1% income shares could also be cointegrated across cross-sections. However, it is more
likely that the likely cross-sectional cointegration is related to consumption and savings through incomes
that are driven by common stochastic trends.
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Table 6: Panel trace cointegration test for savings, consumption and the top 1% income
share for the 3 country groups
Nordics Central-Europe* Anglo-Saxon**
depend. var.: gross savings
top 1%
r=0 211.12 292.15 72.32
(197.64) (307.22) (92.86)
r≤ 1 57.52 - -
(50.71)
depend. var.: private consumption
top 1%
r=0 295.33 294.36 194.75
(167.08) (270.17) (171.47)
r≤1 68.33 72.97 38.86
(51.49) (83.63) (59.64)
countries 3 3 3
years 1960-03 1960-96 1960-00
observations 132 111 123
All series are detrended and demeaned before testing. * In the group of Central European countries, only
GDP per capita and top 1% income share were included in the test, because there were too few time series
observations per country to include a 4 variable. ** for Anglo-Saxon countries, GDP per capita in constant
Euros was used instead of GDP per capita in purchasing power parities in the test with private consump-
tion, because... All variables are tested in logarithms. Bartlett corrected critical values are presented in
parentheses. Lag lengths were selected using Schwarz information criterion.
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As such the results of table 6 contradict the results presented in table 4, where gross
savings and the top 1% income share were found to be cointegrated. Thus, the results
of the cointegration tests for gross savings are somewhat inconclusive. It seems clear,
however, that the top 1% income share and private consumption are cointegrated in all
countries in the dataset.
The results of the panel cointegration rank tests imply that there might be long-
run dependency relations in income and consumption series between the Nordic coun-
tries, which, naturally, could not be eliminated by allowing for short-run dependencies
and/or cross-sectional correlation. Fortunately, Wagner and Hlouskova (2010) have
found that, if there is only a cross-sectionally identical unit-specific cointegrating re-
lationship(s) between cross-sections, it creates only a small bias in the results of used
cointegration estimators.
5 Estimation
According to the results presented in the previous section, the cointegration rank be-
tween tested variables varies between the groups of countries. Because of this, two
different estimation methods are applied to estimate the cointegration coefficient of the
income share of the top 1%. Panel dynamic seemingly unrelated regressors estimator
of Mark et al. (2005) is used when there seems to be only one cointegrating vector be-
tween the variables, and a two-step maximum-likelihood estimator of Breitung (2005)
is used when there seem to be two or more cointegrating relations between the vari-
ables. The reason for using two estimators is that Wagner and Hlouskova (2010) have
found that single-equation estimators, like panel DSUR, perform better, when cross-
sections are cross-sectionally correlated and/or cointegrated.12 Both estimators control
12Results of Wagner and Hlouskova (2010) imply that panel DOLS would perform better than panel
VAR by Breitung (2005) in cross-sectionally cointegrated panels. Panel DSUR was not included in testing.
However, as panel DSUR is more efficient than panel DOLS when cross-sections are correlated, it is also
likely to be more efficient than panel DOLS when cross-sections are cointegrated.
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for possible endogeneity of regressors. A more detailed explanation of the used esti-
mators can be found in the appendix.
The estimated model is:
log(Yit) = αi +γ′1log(GDPit) +γ
′
2log(top1it) ++γ
′
3(interestit) +λit+uit, (7)
where where αi’s are individual constant, λit’s are individual trends, and uit is a white
noise error vector with E(uit) = 0. Table 7 presents the results of estimation of equation
(7) using panel DSUR and panel VAR estimators.13 In the last estimation dependency
rate is also included in the estimation of equation (7).
According to the results presented in table 7, the control variables have a clear
effect on the results of the estimation. In all groups, the initial estimate of the cointe-
grating coefficient of inequality measured with the top 1% income share is negative and
statistically significant at the 0,1% level, but it changes to positive, when the GDP per
capita is added to the estimation.14 When the interest rate is added to the estimation,
the estimate of inequality is statistically significant only in Anglo-Saxon and Nordic
countries. However, as the panel cointegration test by Larsson and Lyhagen (2007)
found that inequality and gross savings were not cointegrated in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, their estimation result may be spurious. So, accordingly, only the results of the
Nordic countries are realiable. Last estimation adds also the dependency rate, which
is commonly used to control for changes in saving patterns across the life cycle. In
this last case, estimation results should be interpreted carefully, because adding depen-
dency rate creates a possible bias in estimates as it may be a trend-stationary variable
(see section 3.2).
Results presented in tables 7 and 6 imply that changes in income inequality do only
have statistically significant effect on gross savings in group of Nordic countries. In
13Estimation was conducted with Gauss. Author is grateful to Donggyu Sul and Joerg Breitung for pro-
viding the program code on their homepages.
14If first equation is estimated with panel VAR, results are similar to those presented in table 7.
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Table 7: Estimates of the long-run elasticity of gross savings with respect to top 1%
income share in 3 groups of countries
Dependent variable: log(gross savings)
Nordics Central-Europe Anglo-Saxon
Panel DSUR (leads & lags=2)
log(top 1%) -0.0846** -0.127*** -0.4462
(0.0288) (0.0405) (0.3706)
Panel VAR (lags=2;1;1)
log(top 1%) 0.0799*** 0.3794 0.2499
(0.0251) (0.2751) (0.1769)
log(GDP) 0.0118*** 0.0946*** 0.0903***
(0.0015) (0.0100) (0.0108)
Panel VAR (lags=2;1;2)
log(top 1%) 0.5654* 0.1866 0.5385*
(0.2512) (0.2583) (0.1990)
log(GDP) 0.1374*** 0.0894*** 0.0983***
(0.0169) (0.0097) (0.0105)
log(interest) -0.3655** -0.0213 0.0990
(0.1237) (0.0477) (0.0803)
Panel VAR (lags=4;3;3)
log(top 1%) 0.3223 0.3845 0.4068**
(0.2292) (0.2162) (0.1441)
log(GDP) 0.1175*** 0.1036*** 0.0819***
(0.0017) (0.0090) (0.0072)
log(interest) -0.396*** 0.0947* -0.0007
(0.0754) (0.0400) (0.0588)
log(dependency) -0.1006 0.1598 -0.2801***
(0.1500) (0.0865) (0.0787)
countries 3 3 3
years 1960-03 1960-96 1960-00
observations 132 111 123
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors of the parameter estimates are presented in paren-
theses. Standard errors are estimated using Andrews and Monahan’s Pre-whitening method. Inclusion of
individual constants means that all estimations are made with fixed effects. Lags gives the lag order of the
VAR model. Leads & lags=1 means that first lags and leads of first differences of explanatory variables are
used as instruments. Leads & lags=2 means that first and second leads and lags of first differences are used
as instruments, etc.
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Central-European countries, income inequality had no statistically significant effect on
savings and results of Anglo-Saxon countries may be a result of spurious regressions.
The reason why gross savings and inequality would be cointegrated in the Nordic coun-
tries, but not in the Anglo-Saxon countries, is likely to be related to the different social
structures between these groups of countries. In Nordic countries, changes in govern-
ment consumption affect income distribution through extensive social security. This ef-
fect is likely to be considerable smaller in Anglo-Saxon countries, where social security
is usually not so extensive as in Nordic countries. However, this does not explain why
gross savings and the top 1% income share were not cointegrated in Central-European
countries, who do have similar structures of social security. This result makes it likely
that gross savings includes elements that are not related to possible changes in income
inequality, e.g., goverment savings. Saving decisions of governments are likely to be
driven mostly by other factors, like the business cycle, than changes in income inequal-
ity. This way income inequality could have only a marginal effect on gross savings.
Theories describing the relation between inequality and savings usually do concen-
trate on household savings behavior, which makes private savings or consumption a
more valid measure to assess the effect of inequality on consumption or savings. Table
8 presents the results of panel DSUR and panel VAR estimations where the dependent
variable is private consumption.15
According to the results presented in table 8, changes in income inequality would
have a different impact on private consumption in different groups of countries. Once
again, results including dependency rate needs to be taken only as suggestive, as it is
possible that dependency rate is a stationary variable and including it to the estimation
may bias the results. Thus, we rely more on the results presented in the 3rd estimation,
which includes the top 1% income share, the GDP per capita, and the interest rate.
15Estimation was conducted with Gauss. Author is grateful to Donggyu Sul and Joerg Breitung for pro-
viding the program code on their homepages.
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Table 8: Estimates of the long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to top
1% income share in 3 groups of countries
Dependent variable: log(private consumption)
Nordics Central-Europe Anglo-Saxon
Panel DSUR (leads & lags=2)
log(top 1%) -0.1051*** -0.1480*** -0.0704*
(0.0119) (0.0168) (0.0304)
Panel VAR (lags=2;1;2)
log(top 1%) -0.1409** -0.2101*** 0.1130***
(0.0490) (0.0530) (0.0290)
log(GDP) 0.0905*** 0.1002*** 0.0982***
(0.0039) (0.0026) (0.0021)
Panel VAR (lags=1;1;2)
log(top 1%) -0.1349* -0.1748*** 0.0826***
(0.0512) (0.0451) (0.0262)
log(GDP) 0.0919*** 0.0996*** 0.1007***
(0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0021)
log(interest) -0.0132 0.0203 -0.0383***
(0.0262) (0.0120) (0.0108)
Panel VAR (lags=4;2;3)
log(top 1%) -0.1765*** -0.0731 0.0957***
(0.0458) (0.0387) (0.0185)
log(GDP) 0.0878*** 0.1005*** 0.1005***
(0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0022)
log(interest) 0.0082 -0.0057 -0.0297***
(0.0230) (0.0086) (0.0069)
log(dependency) 0.0174 -0.0012 -0.0252
(0.0305) (0.0220) (0.0150)
Panel VAR (lags=-;-;1)
log(top 1%) - - 0.0852***
(0.0202)
log(GDP) - - 0.0963***
(0.0022)
log(interest) - - -0.0350***
(0.0084)
log(credit) - - 0.0026*
(0.0010)
countries 3 3 3
years 1960-03 1960-96 1960-00
observations 132 111 123
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors of the parameter estimates are presented in parenthe-
ses. Standard errors are estimated using Andrews and Monahan’s Pre-whitening method. Lags gives the lag
order of the VAR model. Individual constants and trends are included in the regressions. Leads & lags=1
means that first lags and leads of first differences of explanatory variables are used as instruments. Leads &
lags=2 means that first and second leads and lags of first differences are used as instruments, etc.26
According to the results of this estimation, the GDP per capita has a expected posi-
tive sign in all groups of countries, but the interest rate has a statistically significant
negative effect only in the group of Anglo-Saxon countries. The "blurry" estimate of
interest rates in Central-European countries is not a surprise as these countries had a
differing indicators of interest rates. In Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries, individual
countries had the same indicator of interest rates within groups, but the indicator dif-
fered between groups. In Anglo-Saxon countries, treasury bill rate was used, whereas
in Nordic countries, central bank rate was used. Although, it is surprising that results
indicate that interest rates had no statistically significant effect on the level of private
consumption in Nordic countries, result may be explained by different consumption
profiles. Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) found that in United States and Canada the
changes in credit conditions had a larger impact on consumption than in France or UK.
Humphrey (2004) also shows that credit cards are used more often as a means of pay-
ment in Canada and US than in Europe. Thus, it is likely that changes in the interest
rates have a greater effect in private consumption in Anglo-Saxon than in European
countries.
According to the results of estimation including the top 1% income share, the GDP
per capita, and the interest rate, the long-run elasticity of private consumption with
respect to inequality would be negative in Nordic and Central-European countries, but
in Anglo-Saxon countries, the effect would be positive. To check that this ’anomaly’
is not caused by expansion of credit in the wake of rising inequality, domestic credit
claims on the private sector is added as an explanatory variable to the estimation of
Anglo-Saxon countries.16 The variable is obtained from IMF database. Unfortunately,
there were no data for Central-European and Nordic countries for the whole time pe-
riod, and so domestic credit claims could not be included in their estimations. In the
Anglo-Saxon case, logarithmic domestic credit claims is found to be I(1) according to
16The variable is expressed in purchasing power parities.
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all panel unit root tests used in section 3. Adding a measure of credit does not change
main results for Anglo-Saxon countries and it has expected statistically significant pos-
itive effect on private consumption.17
Thus, results presented in table 8 imply that saving functions of individuals would
differ between Anglo-Saxon and European countries. In Anglo-Saxon countries, in-
equality of income increases aggregate private consumption whereas in Central-European
and Nordic countries inequality was found to decrease private consumption. This
means that in European countries individual saving function would be convex, whereas
in Anglo-Saxon countries it would be concave. This result links this study to the long
line of research on the variations in the propensity to save across income classes start-
ing, at least, from Fisher (1930). Result obtained here also contradict some quite re-
cent microeconomic evidence from US stating that propensity to save raises with in-
come (Dynan et al. 2004). However, as was presented in the introduction, results of
aggregate studies have been mixed. Results presented here imply that some of this
observed controversy in previous macro studies might be explained by country differ-
ences. Despite of this, it is unclear of why these countries would differ in this respect
and there is a possibility that the results of this study are driven by some features of the
data that could not be identified and controlled with the used estimation methods. If
the model (7) is estimated without the GDP per capita series, the cointegrating coeffi-
cient of inequality in Anglo-Saxon countries changes from positive to negative (-0.044)
and remains statistically significant. The GDP per capita series only has this effect in
Anglo-Saxon countries, which implies that GDP per capita series may be the source
of this possible bias. One possible source of such bias could be the existence of non-
identical cross-sectional cointegration relations in the GDP per capita series between
Anglo-Saxon countries. In this case, estimators used to estimate equation (7) are likely
17Results do not change if dependency rate is added to estimation.
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to be adversely affected (Wagner and Hlouskova 2010).18 Unfortunately, we do not
know any way of testing this assumption within the limited time series extent of our
data.19 Therefore, more empirical research is needed to find are the results for Anglo-
Saxon countries presented here driven by such cross-sectional dependency relations.
6 Conclusions
According to the results, income inequality, measured with the top 1% income share,
aggregate savings and private consumption are driven by stochastic processes. The top
1% income share and private consumption were also found to be cointegrated, but top
1% income share and gross savings was found to be cointegrated only in Nordic coun-
tries. The long-run elasticity of private consumption with respect to inequality was
found to be negative in Central-European and Nordic countries, but positive in Anglo-
Saxon countries. This result implies that, in Anglo-Saxon countries, the marginal
propensity to save would decrease with income, while in European countries it would
increase. However, results of Anglo-Saxon countries crucially depend on the inclusion
of the GDP per capita series. If the GDP per capita was not included in the estimation,
the cointegrating coefficient of the top 1% income share was negative and statistically
significant. This implies that the inclusion of the GDP per capita series may introduce
such bias in the estimation results of Anglo-Saxon countries which cannot be controlled
with current panel estimation methods.
Individual cointegration relations in the GDP per capita series that are not identical
across the Anglo-Saxon countries could be one source of such bias. These kind of de-
pendency relations would cause estimators to be biased in ways that are not yet exactly
known. The existence of such non-identical cointegration relations could not be tested,
18We, or Wagner and Hlouskova (2010), do not know any estimation method that would correct for this
kind of cross-sectional cointegration.
19There is a way to test for cointegration relations between countries using a test for cointegrated systems
by Gonzalo and Granger (1995). However, the test requires that we have a lot more time series observations
per country than we have in our dataset.
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because testing would have required considerably more time series observations that
were available in our dataset. So, results for Anglo-Saxon countries remain ambiguous
and this ambiguity needs to be addressed in future studies.
In Nordic and Central-European countries, individual cointegrating relations may
not have been identical within groups of countries, which could have biased their esti-
mation results. However, if this assumption is violated, it would imply that the underly-
ing economic theory is not applicable across countries with similar economic structures
questioning the validity of the theory. Estimation results were also unchanged when
only the top 1% income share was used as an explanatory variable. In this case there
can be only one cointegration vector between variables, which implies that if the num-
ber of cointegration vectors has differed within the groups of countries in estimations
with several explanatory variables, this has not changed basic results.
So, although results of Anglo-Saxon countries are somewhat inconclusive, results
for Nordic and Central-European countries clearly indicate that income inequality leads
to greater level of private savings. This result is well in-line with the theoretical and
micro-econometric evidence. It also implies that the controversy surrounding the result
of previous aggregate studies has been likely to result from a miss-specification of the
estimated models by assuming a stationary income inequality.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Cointegration test by Banerjee and Carrion-I-Silvestre (2006)
Panel cointegration test developed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) is
based on the normalized bias and the pseudo t-ratio test statistics by Pedroni (2004).
The data generating process behind Pedroni’s test statistics is given by:
yit = fi(t) + x′it + eit,
4xit = vit,
eit = ρiei,t−1 + itζit = (it,vit)′,
(8)
where fi(t) includes member specific fixed effects and deterministic trends.
The data generating process is described as a partitioned vector z′it ≡ (yit, xit) where
the true process is generated as zit = zi,t−1 +ζit, ζ′it = (ζ
y
itζ
X
it ) (Pedroni 2004).
1√
T
∑[Tr]
t=1 ζit
is assumed to converge to a vector Brownian motion with asymptotic covariance of
Ωi as T −→ ∞. The individual process is assumed to be i.i.d. so that E[ζitζ′js] = 0
∀s, t, i , j.
Let eˆit denote the estimated residuals of obtained from (8) and Ωˆi the consistent
estimator of Ωi. The two test statistics can now be defined as :
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residuals µˆit, µˆ∗it and ϑˆit are attained from regressions: eˆit = γˆeˆi,t−1 + µˆit, eˆit = γˆieˆi,t−1 +∑K−i
k=1 γˆik∆eˆi,t−k + µˆ
∗
it, ∆yit =
∑M
m=1 bˆmi∆xmi,t = ϑˆit. (Pedroni 1999, 2004)
The statistics pool the between dimension of the panel and they are constructed by
computing the ratio of the corresponding conventional time series statistics and then
by computing the standardized sum of the N time series of the panel. Pedroni (1999,
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2004) shows that under the null of no cointegration the asymptotic distributions of the
two statistics presented above converge to normal distributions with zero mean and
variance of one as N and T sequentially converge to infinity.
Banerjee and Carrion-I-Silvestre (2006) extend the model by Pedroni (2004) to
include common factors:
yi,t = fi(t) + x′i,t +ui,t,
4xi,t = vi,t,
fi(t) = µi +βit+ θDUi,t +γiDT ∗i,t,
uit = F′tpii + eit
(9)
where ei,t = ρiei,t + i,t,
DUi,t =
{
0 t ≤ Tbi
1 t > tbi
, (10)
DT ∗i,t =
{
0 t ≤ Tbi
(t− tbi) t > tbi , (11)
where Tbi = λiT, λi ∈Λ, denotes the time of the break for the i-th unit in a closed subset
of (0,1), and F′t :s are the common factors which are used to account for the possible
cross-sectional dependence. The cointegrating vector is specified as a function of time:
δi,t =
{
δi,1 t ≤ Tbi
δi,2 t > tbi
. (12)
Banerjee & Carrion-i-Silvestre’s test computes a Zet¯NT (λ) = N
−1 ∑N
i=1 t pˆi (λ) statistic
for each break point using the idiosyncratic disturbance terms (eit). The break point is
estimated as the argument that minimizes the sequence of standardized statistics. Thus,
the estimated break date is given by
Tˆb = argmin
λ∈Λ
N−1/2Zet¯NT (λ)−Θe2(λ)
√
N√
ψe2(λ)
 .
APPENDIX B: Panel trace cointegration test statistic by Larsson and Lyhagen
(2007)
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The trace cointegration test by Larsson and Lyhagen (2007) is based on the follow-
ing model:
4Yt = µ+ΠYt−1 +Σm−1k=1 ∆Yt−k + t, (13)
where µ = (µ′1,µ
′
2, ...,µ
′
N)
′, t = (′1t, 
′
2t, ..., 
′
nt), Yt−1 and ∆Yt−k are of order Np× 1, Π
and Γk are Np× Np, and t is assumed to be multivariate normally distributed with
mean zero and covariance matrix Ωi j.
It is assumed that matrix Π has a reduced rank of Nr, 0 ≤ r ≤ p, which is specified
as Π = αikβ′k j (Larsson and Lyhagen 2007). Matrices α and β are both order of Np×Nr
and the former contains the short-run coefficient and the latter the long-run coefficient.
In β, βii ≡ βi for each rank of r. Because of the restriction, βk j = 0 ∀i , j, the block
matrix elements of Π are given by ΣNk=1αikβ
′
k j = αi jβ
′
j.
The cointegration rank is estimated by sequentially testing
H(r) : rank(Π) ≤ Nr (14)
against the alternative
H(p) : rank(Π) ≤ Np, (15)
which is the same method as in Johansen (1995).
Define QT as the maximum likelihood ratio test statistic for the test of H(r) against
H(p), and assume that the matrix α′ ⊥ Γβ ⊥ has a full rank and that the roots of the
characteristic polynomial
A(z) = (1− z)INp−αβ′z−Σm−1i=1 Γk(1− z)zi (16)
lie outside the complex unit circle. Now, if r > 0,
-2 log Qt
w−→ U +V, (17)
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as T −→∞, where V is χ2 with N(N−1)r(p− r) degrees of freedom independent of U,
and
U = tr

∫
dBF′
(∫
FF′
)−1 ∫
FdB′
 . (18)
Larsson and Lyhagen (2007) show that the limit distribution of the test statistic (17)
equals the convolution of Dickey-Fuller distribution (B) and an independent χ2 variate
(F). The distribution can be simulated by approximating the Wiener process of B by a
random walk.
APPENDIX C: Panel DSUR and panel VAR estimators
The data generation process in Mark et al. (2005) DSUR estimator is of the form
yit = αi +λit+ θt +β′xit +uit, (19)
4xit = eit (20)
where there are n cointegrating regression each with T observations, (1− β′) is the
cointegration vector between yit and xit, and xit and eit are k× 1 dimensional vectors.
Panel DSUR eliminates the possible endogeneity between explanatory variables and
the dependent variable by assuming that uit is correlated at most with pi leads and lags
of 4xit (Mark et al. 2005). The possible endogeneity can be controlled by projecting
uit onto these pi leads and lags:
uit =
pi∑
s=−pi
δ′i,s4xi,t−s +uit∗ = δ′izit +u∗it. (21)
The projection error u∗it is orthogonal to all leads and lags of 4xit and the estimated
equation becomes:
yit = αi +λit + θt +β′xit +δizit +u∗it, (22)
where δ′izit is a vector of projection dimensions. Panel DSUR estimates a long-run co-
variance matrix that is used in estimation of equation (19). This makes panel DSUR
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more efficient when cross-sections are dependent. The efficiency of panel DSUR actu-
ally improves as the correlation between cross-sections increases. Asymptotics prop-
erties of the estimator are based on T −→∞ with N fixed.
In the estimator by Breitung (2005) a panel VAR(p) model is presented in VECM
form as
4yit = Ψidt +αiβ′y,t−1 +Σp−1j=1 Γi j4 yi,t− j + it, (23)
where dt is a vector of deterministic variables and ψi a k× k matrix of unknown coef-
ficients, Γi j is unrestricted matrix, and it is a white noise error vector with E(it) = 0
and positive definite covariance matrix Σi = E(it′it).
First models are estimated separately across N cross-section units. Then cointe-
gration vectors are normalized so that they do not depend on individual specific pa-
rameters. In the second stage, the system is transformed to a pooled regression of the
form:
zˆit = β′yi,t−1 + vˆit, (24)
where zˆit = (αˆ′i Σˆ
−1
i αˆi)
−1αˆ′i Σˆ
−1
i 4 yit and vˆit is estimated from a transformed VECM
model. It is assumed that statistical units included in the panel have the same cointe-
gration rank. Cross-sectional correlation is accounted by using a estimated asymptotic
covariance matrix. (Breitung 2005)
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